Bargaining efficiency and screening: An experimental investigation

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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 285-304, July 2000
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1103
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1103
dc.contributor.author Charness, Gary
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 1998-01-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 285-304, July 2000
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1103
dc.description.abstract This paper investigates whether information about fairness types can be useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. An experiment was conducted in which subjects were first screened using a dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participants into two types. Mutually anonymous pairs of subjects then bargained, with a dispute cost structure imposed. Sorting with identification reduces dispute costs; there are also significant differences in bargaining efficiency across pairing types. Information about types is crucial for these differences and also strongly affects the relative bargaining success of the two types and the hypothetical optimal bargaining strategy.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 284
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Bargaining efficiency and screening: An experimental investigation
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2014-06-03T07:13:56Z
dc.subject.keyword Behavioral and Experimental Economics
dc.subject.keyword bargaining efficiency
dc.subject.keyword dispute resolution
dc.subject.keyword experiment
dc.subject.keyword fairness
dc.subject.keyword sorting
dc.subject.keyword leex
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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