Mulligan, Casey B.; Sala i Martín, Xavier. Social Security in Theory and Practice (I): Facts and Political Theories. 2005
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1059
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Title:
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Social Security in Theory and Practice (I): Facts and Political Theories |
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Author:
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Mulligan, Casey B.; Sala i Martín, Xavier
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Other authors:
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Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
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Abstract:
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166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which are increasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implications of all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.
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Document type:
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Working paper
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Date:
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2005 |
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Rights:
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